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PARTIES 
The caption of the case on the cover shows all of the 
parties. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction by virtue of Sec. 78-2A-3 (h) , 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Third Judicial District Court, Judge Richard K. Moffat, 
entered a decree of divorce (R. 113) , which would be final and 
absolute July 23, 1986, but reserving the issues regarding the 
division of property, alimony, child support, etc., for later 
determination. On February 3, 1988, Judge Moffat entered a 
Supplemental Decree awarding the Respondent (plaintiff below) 
alimony for an indeterminate period. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The Appellant (defendant below) contends that under the 
facts of this case the Court erred in awarding permanent alimony. 
That is the sole issue on appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OR STATUTES 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions or 
statutes involved. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Supplemental Decree of Divorce, 
entered by the trial court under date of February 3, 1988 (R. 
452) awarding Respondent permanent alimony. Appellant appeals, 
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contending that based on the facts in the record, it was an error 
to make the alimony permanent• 
B. COURSE OF PROCEDURE 
The case was bifurcated for trial. The court entered a 
final decree of divorce, effective the 23rd day of July, 1986 
(R. 113). Thereafter, on the 15th day of April, 1987, a trial 
was held on the other issues (R. 256). The trial court rendered 
its Memorandum Decision on May 27, 1987 (R. 334); Findings of 
Fact were initially entered on June 29, 1987 (R. 36C) but object-
ions were filed thereto (R. 375) and new Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and a Supplemental Decree cf Divorce ^ere 
entered February 3, 1988 (R. 452-469). 
C. DISPOSITION AT THE TRIAL COURT 
The trial court in its Supplemental Decree of Divorce 
awarded permanent alimony in the following language: 
14. Defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff as alimony the 
sum of $1,050 per month commencing with the month of July, 
1987, for a period of one year, at which time alimony shall 
reduce to $800 per month for a period of one year, at which 
time it shall reduce to $650 per month. Plaintiff's en-
titlement to alimony shall continue until such time as 
plaintiff should remarry, cohabit or die or defendant should 
die, whichever event occurs first, but to be subject to 
modification pursuant to applicable Utah law. 
D. RECORD ON APPEAL 
Unfortunately there is no trial transcript, because the 
court reporter's notes have been lost. The parties, therefore, 
proceeded under this Court's Rule 11(g) and stipulated to the 
major facts (R. 616). That stipulation (which is set forth next 
below) was approved by the trial court on March 31, 1989 (R. 
615). In addition to the facts set forth in the stipulation, the 
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parties stipulated that the depositions of the parties could be 
published and transmitted as a part of the record on appeal 
(R. 620) and, of course, the pleadings and memoranda filed by the 
parties a-re before the court. The stipulation of facts is as 
follows (R. 616): 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff/Respondent was born in Seattle, Washing-
ton, on June 13, 1947; the Defendant/Appellant was born in 
Utah on March 16, 19 47. Both have been and now are in good 
health. 
2. The parties were married on the 9th day of Septem-
ber, 1970. Three children have been born as issue of that 
marriage; namely: Erin Van Wagoner, born March 19, 1975; 
Gavin Van Wagoner, born January 25, 1978; Morgan Van Wagon-
er, born January 22, 1981. 
3. In the Spring of 1969 while Respondent was attend-
ing Brigham Young University, she applied and was accepted 
for training as a stewardess for Pan American Airlines. It 
was the intent of Respondent prior to meeting the Appellant 
to become a stewardess. While waiting for Pan American 
training school to begin in September, she met the Appel-
lant. A romantic relationship developed and the parties 
through discussions agreed that the Respondent should change 
her plans and remain in Provo. She did so, rescheduling the 
Pan American training school in Florida to the Summer of 
1970. Thereafter through the fall of 1970 and the spring of 
1971 Respondent enrolled in a three-semester program at the 
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Brigham Young University, which was necessary for a teaching 
certificate. Such a certificate was obtained after the 
parties moved to North Carolina, and Respondent was certi-
fied to teach school in Utah and North Carolina, Respondent 
has not maintained the certificate and would need to be 
recertified if she were to teach. She has, however, com-
pleted four to five hours of the nine hours required for 
recertification. 
4. Immediately before her marriage to the Appellant, 
Respondent was working part-time as a waitress at Sambo's 
Restaurant in Prove, Utah. The parties were engaged in 1970 
and the Respondent quit her job at Sambo's to begin the 
aforementioned three-semester program at BYU needed to 
obtain her Utah teaching certificate. 
5. Appellant completed work for an undergraduate 
degree in history at the BYU. While attending school, he 
worked part-time as a teaching assistant in the Flistory 
Department and part-time as a fry cook. The summer immedi-
ately before the marriage Appellant worked full-time as a 
fry cook and Respondent worked full-time as a hostess at a 
local restaurant. Appellant was accepted in the Fall of 
19 70 to study law at Duke University. 
6. In the summer of 1971 Appellant and Respondent 
travelled to Durham, North Carolina, where the Appellant 
began law school studies and Respondent began teaching. 
Between the fall of 1971 and the spring of 1974 Respondent 
taught elementary school in the Orange and Durham County 
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school districts in North Carolina. She worked full-time as 
a teacher while Appellant was in law school. 
7. Appellant's law school expense was paid for by a 
combination of scholarship money from Duke University and 
gifts from his parents. 
8. After Appellant graduated from law school the 
parties moved to Salt Lake City, where he was employed by a 
local law firm. From this point forward Appellant began to 
provide almost 100% of the marital income. 
9. In 1977 Appellant accepted employment with a Los 
Angeles law firm, O'Melveny & Myers and the parries moved to 
Los Angeles. The work assignment from that law firm enabled 
the parties to travel rather extensively, at the law firm's 
expense, to San Francisco, and an extended trip to Europe. 
10. In 1980 Appellant changed his employment by 
quitting his position in Los Angeles and taking a position 
with a lav/ firm in Salt Lake City, Utah. The parties again, 
following plaintiff's employment, moved from Los Angeles to 
Salt Lake City, where they purchased a large home near the 
Salt Lake Country Club. From 1980 to the filing of this 
action for divorce Appellant worked as a lawyer and Respon-
dent remained in the heme caring for the parties' three 
children. During this period they purchased many items of 
furniture and three new automobiles. They also were able to 
continue to travel extensively. 
11. After their return to Salt Lake City in 1980 
Respondent became involved in a number of volunteer 
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projects, including serving as president of the local PTA, 
became a member of a book club and performed in a number of 
regular church assignments, 
12. The parties separated in June of 1985. 
13. In 1986, after the parties separated, Respondent 
began working part-time at the Salt Lake Tribune. She was 
working on an average of three days a week on an 8 hours a 
day basis and was paid $8 an hour. Her gross annual income 
from this was $9,984. 
14. There was testimony from a qualified witness that 
Respondent had favorable and immediate employment prospects 
as a teacher, and would be capable of making a minimum of 
$16,000 per year over a nine-month period. Appellant has 
chcsen not to seek employment as a teacher and as a matter 
of personal choice has chosen her current work at the Salt 
Lake Tribune and to pursue a career in newspapers. 
15. Respondent's work at the Tribune is in the Promo-
tions Department, and includes responding to teacher re-
quests to visit classrooms as one method of teaching the 
teachers how to use the newspapers as a teaching tool in the 
classroom. Respondent also from time to time works as a 
substitute teacher. She worked in this capacity a total of 
about 15 days in the last half of 1986. 
16. Respondent started her work with the Tribune in 
October of 1986. She is paid around $40 per day and works 
part-time. 
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17. The parties stipulate that the deposition of 
Appellant and the deposition of Respondent may be published 
and transmitted together with the exhibits as a part of the 
record. 
18. David Dorton, a valuation expert, testified 
concerning the value of the law degree earned by Mark Van 
Wagoner during the marriage. His testimony, which was 
recapped in Exhibit P-23, was that the present value of Mark 
Van Wagoner's law degree was the sum of $343,200. If it 
were %tax adjusted, it would reduce the value to a present 
value of $247,100. 
We next note the Respondent's deposition: 
Respondent's deposition was taken January 6, 1987. She 
testified as follows: 
She attended B.Y.U. from 1965 to 1969 and obtained a B.A. 
degree in Humanities (Depos. p. 5). She taught school in North 
Carolina while Appellant attended law school (Depos. p. 6). She 
dropped her teaching certificate in 1985 or 1986 and needed to be 
recertificated (Depos. p.6). She has taken four or five hours of 
the required nine hours for recertification (Depos. p. 7) . 
She worked sporadically after the marriage (Depos. p. 8). 
In the Spring of 1985 she worked as a teacher approximately 30 to 
34 days. After the parties separated in June 1985, however, she 
made no attempt to find work. In refusing her request for more 
temporary alimony in August of 1986, the trial court cautioned 
the Respondent that the existing financial status of the parties 
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was such that she should exercise efforts to obtain gainful 
employment. (See Order filed, but unsigned, R. 165, 27.) Accord-
ingly, she started at the Salt Lake Tribune in October of 1986 
(Depcs. p. 6), where she took a part-time job that paid $9,984 
per year. 
Next we refer to the Court's Memorandum Decision (P. 334) 
where the trial court stated: 
"It is the view of the Court that the parties, even prior to 
their separation, were living at a financial level that 
could not be sustained. If that is a fact, it is even more 
obvious that having separated, they cannot continue to each 
be sustained at the same level that existed before. . . . " 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in awarding 
permanent alimony. Respondent is a college graduate and has 
completed sufficient additional college work to obtain her 
teacher's certificate. The trial court expressly fcund (P. 447) 
that Respondent is a healthy, able bodied person, capable of 
gainful employment. At a minimum, she had favorable and immedi-
ate employment prospects as a teacher and would be capable of 
making a minimum of $16,000 per year over a nine-month period. 
As she has demonstrated, permanent alimony award permits her the 
luxury of working only part-time throughout the lifetime of the 
parties. The court's award does not encourage her to become 
independent or to further her education, as she once represented 
to the court she intended to do (see Appendix B) . To the con-
trary, she has elected to take a part-time job with the Salt Lake 
Tribune. 
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During their marriage, she fully shared in Appellantfs 
earnings. The property accumulated by them has been equitably 
divided. The fact that at the time of the divorce they were 
living beyond their means should not be justification for a 
permanent subsidy to her. She is capable of supporting herself 
and after a reasonable adjustment period the alimony should have 
been terminated. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH LAW PROVIDES PERMANENT ALIMONY ONLY UNDER CERTAIN 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
A. This is Not a Case of Equitable Restoration. 
The most permanent of alimony is an award of the future 
earnings of the spouse. The Respondent sought such an a<*ard by 
asking for an interest in the Appellantfs law degree. The court 
rightly rejected that argument. It is clear under the Utah cases 
that a professional degree is not property. See Petersen v. 
Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1987); and Gardner v. Gardner, 
748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988). On the other hand, this court has 
held that where the wife sacrificed current income to help the 
husband advance his education and was then abandoned, without 
sharing his increased income, the court can provide rehabili-
tative alimony. See Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah App. 
1988). 
In Martinez, the husband left a full-time job to return to 
school. He later decided to stay in school and apply to medical 
school. Medical school was seen by the wife as a threat to the 
marriage because of the four years of unemployment and the 
husband's absence from the family. She agreed to the hardship 
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with the assurance that some day he would make it up to her; that 
they would have greater assets and income. He graduated in 1981. 
Two years later she filed for divorce. The court later awarded 
her alimony for a period of five years. On appeal, the award was 
made permanent for two reasons. First, that the wife had very 
limited education (high school) and work experience; second, 
because she had not participated in sharing the income increased 
by her sacrifices to send her husband to medical school. 
In its decision the court cited to the Petersen case, supra, 
where Judge Orme recognized that a case might arise whereby one 
spouse was reaching a high level of income just at the time cf 
the divorce, rather than the more frequent situation where the 
parties had enjoyed the benefits of the husband's medical educa-
tion for a number of years. 
The court then cited with approval a Colorado case, In re 
Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978), which the 
court said typified the recurring issue: 
. where divorce occurs shortly after the professional 
degree is obtained, traditional alimony analysis would often 
work hardship, because while both spouses had modest incomes 
at the time of the divorce, the one is on the [threshold] of 
a significant increase in earnings. Moreover, the spouse 
who sacrificed so that the other could obtain a degree is 
precluded from enjoying the anticipated dividends the degree 
will ordinarily provide. . . . In such cases alimony 
analysis must become more creative to achieve fairness, and 
an award of "rehabilitative" or "reimbursement" alimony, not 
terminable upon remarriage, may be appropriate. 
The court next noted on page 77 that in the Martinez case 
there had been little property accumulated and because the higher 
income level would reasonably be reached after the divorce, 
plaintiff was entitled to a more permanent remedy. To support 
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that idea, the Court next cited Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357 
N.W. 2d 250 (S.D. 1984), in which the Supreme Court of South 
Dakota held: 
. . ."in a proper case," the trial court should consider 
"all relevant factors" in awarding "reimbursement or rehab-
ilitative alimony." These included "the amount of the 
supporting spouse's contributions, his or her foregone 
opportunities to enhance or improve professional or voca-
tional skills, and the duration of the marriage following 
completion of the nonsupporting spouse's professional 
education." Id. at 262 
The Court also borrowed reasoning from some Wisconsin 
statutes which permit their trial courts to grant an order 
requiring maintenance payments to either party after considering 
several factors, among which are: 
(4) The educational life of each party at the time of the 
marriage, and at the time the action is commenced. 
(5) The earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance, 
including educational background, training, employment 
skills, work experience, length of absence from the job 
market, custodial responsibilities for children and the time 
and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or 
training to enable the party to find appropriate employment. 
(6) The feasibility that the party seeking maintenance can 
become self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably 
comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage, and, if so, 
the length of time necessary to achieve this goal. 
The Utah court then in Footnote 10 to its opinion said: 
We emphasize the specific nature of the facts presented in 
this case and stress that equitable restitution would not be 
awarded in the more frequent case where the marriage lasted 
for many years after the professional degree had been 
granted. There, sufficient assets would have been accumu-
lated and an appropriate distribution to the requesting 
spouse would enable that spouse to share in the economic 
benefits earned as a result of the degree. 
While the Court is talking about a special remedy of equita-
ble restitution, the context in which the discussion occurs 
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clearly indicates that these are the criteria to be considered in 
awarding alimony and in establishing its duration. 
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Jackson observed that in 
Petersen v. Petersen, supra, the Utah Court of Appeals had held 
that an advance degree is not marital property, subject to 
division upon divorce, but acknowledged that there may be situa-
tions where equity demands an extraordinary award of alimony in 
order to compensate a spouse who endures substantial financial 
sacrifices or defers her own education to help the other spouse 
in obtaining an advance degree. He cites Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 
P.2d 238, 241 (Utah App. 1987) holding that: 
.This might occur where: (a) the parties mutually 
•endeavor to increase one spouse's earning capacity, but at 
the time of trial the spouse who has benefitted from the 
parties' endeavors is merely on the threshold of a substan-
tial increase in earnings, Petersen, 737 2d at 242 n.4; or 
(b) there is insufficient marital property from which to 
make a compensatory award to the contributing spouse, 
[citing Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988)] 
Judge Jackson then noted: 
In such cases, the spouse who has made substantial financial 
sacrifices and contributions to increase the earning capaci-
ty of the other spouse is entitled to recompense for those 
contributions that are beyond the duty of support normally 
associated with marriage, less any benefits received, 
[citing cases from Wisconsin and New Jersey] 
B. The Factors Permitting Permanent Alimony are Missing 
In This Case. 
Apparently no Utah case has reversed a trial court's award 
of permanent alimony. In those several cases where the trial 
awards have been made permanent, the Court has detailed the 
factors to be considered in explaining why permanent alimony 
should have been awarded. These cases highlight extreme situa-
tions like a wife who was approaching normal retirement age, or 
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was in poor health. In those cases she lacked the training, or 
health, necessary to permit her to enter the job market and earn 
anything but a meager salary. In other cases, like Martinez, the 
wife had made substantial sacrifices to enable the husband to 
earn a graduate degree in medicine or in law. She had "stuck by 
him" with the express promise of participating in the increased 
earnings, but they divorced and she would not otherwise have 
participated in the promised higher earnings. 
These decisions do net hold, nor even suggest, that in all 
cases alimony should be permanent. Rather, by negative implica-
tion they suggest that where, as here, the wife did net make 
substantial sacrifices to enable the husband to complete his 
graduate work; where the marriage endured for a substantial 
period of years after the husband entered the practice of his 
profession; where the wife enjoyed the benefits of his higher 
earnings; where the parties had accumulated property which was 
equitably divided at the divorce; and where the wife had the 
necessary training and skills so that she can enter the job 
market and support herself, alimony should end at some fixed 
future date. 
This case should be controlled by Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 
P. 2d 238 (Utah App. 1987). Significantly, the decision in this 
case was not available at the time of the trial. There, the 
trial court had found that the husband's medical degree was a 
marital asset and had ordered Dr. Rayburn to pay Mrs. Rayburn her 
share of the asset, $45,000, at $750 a month "to maintain her 
life style for a period of adjustment". The initial trial court 
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decision awarded Dr. Rayburn all of his retirement fund, but two 
weeks later the trial court altered its decision on the retire-
ment plan and ordered Dr. Rayburn to pay one-half of the net 
present value of the retirement plan ($56,850) to Mrs. Rayburn in 
five annual installments of $11,370, plus interest. The decree 
awarded no alimony. 
The Court of Appeals, citing Petersen v. Petersen, 73 7 P.2d 
237, reversed the trial court and reaffirmed its holding that an 
advanced degree is not marital property, but may be considered as 
a factor in alimony analysis. The Court, however, found that 
permanent alimony was inequitable for Mrs. Rayburn. Mrs. Rayburn 
had a post graduate degree; she had worked during Dr. Rayburnf s 
internship and some of his residency, "but upon the birth of 
their first child, she stopped working full-time and worked only 
occasionally and on a part-time basis, throughout the rest of the 
marriage." (738 P.2d at 239) 
In awarding alimony for five years, the Court noted that 
while Mrs. Rayburn was unemployed, "she had been employed and was 
well-educated". (738 P.2d at 241). The monthly payments were 
necessary to maintain her life style "for a period of adjust-
ment". The Court based the five-year limit on the time it would 
take her to complete additional education and "until the parties1 
youngest child was in school all day." (738 P.2d at 241) 
In this decision the Court noted: 
We acknowledge that there will be situations where an award 
of non-terminable rehabilitative or reimbursement alimony 
would be appropriate . . . . However, this not such a case. 
Although Mrs. Rayburn worked periodically during the mar-
riage, she did not endure substantial financial sacrifices 
or defer her own education to help him obtain the degree. 
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In addition, Mrs, Rayburn shared the financial rewards 
permitted by her husband's advanced degree for several 
years. Those rewards also resulted in the accumulation of 
considerable real and personal property during their mar-
riage, which was equitably divided upon their divorce. The 
award of temporary alimony, at $75 0 per month for a maximum 
of five years, adequately meets Mrs. Rayburnfs support needs 
and is readily sustainable under the criteria outlined in 
Jones. 
The reasoning of Rayburn fits the facts of this case. As in 
Rayburn, the Respondent is well-educated. She has worked before 
and during the marriage. The youngest child is now in school all 
day. Moreover, the Respondent endured no substantial financial 
sacrifices, nor did she defer her own education tc help the 
Appellant obtain his law degree. Also, like Rayburn, the Respon-
dent here has shared in the financial rewards permitted by the 
Appellant's education. Those rewards here — as in Rayburn — 
resulted in the accumulation of considerable marital property 
which the Appendix A hereto shows was equitably divided. 
In Rayburn the court awarded temporary alimony of $750 per 
month for a maximum of five years, which, said the court, "ade-
quately meets Mrs. Rayburn's support needs". According to the 
Court, that award "is readily sustainable". The Rayburn case 
dictates that the same criteria be applied to the facts of this 
case. This would require a reversal of the award of permanent 
alimony. 
Other cases direct the same result. In Jones v. Jones, 700 
P. 2d 1072 (Utah 1985), the Supreme Court reversed the trial court 
which had awarded monthly alimony for five years at $1,000, $750 
for five additional years, and $500 thereafter. At page 1075 the 
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court noted that three factors must be considered in fixing a 
reasonable alimony award: 
[1] the financial conditions and needs of the wife; 
[2] the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income 
for herself; and 
[3] the ability of the husband to provide support. 
In addressing the second factor — the wifefs ability to 
produce a sufficient income for herself, the ccurt noted: 
. . .She was married at the age of 23 and was 52 years old 
at the time of trial. The paid work she did in the early 
years of the marriage and the miscellaneous functions she 
performed at the pharmacy and gift shop were all relatively 
unskilled in nature. . . .She has no professional training 
and few marketable skills. . . .The wife has no independent 
income. It is entirely unrealistic to assume that a woman 
in her mid-50 fs with no substantial work experience or 
training will be able to enter the job market and support 
herself in anything even resembling the style in which the 
couple had been living. 
In Olson v. Olson, 704 P. 2d 564 (Utah 1985), the Supreme 
Court gave a permanent award, in part because the wife: 
. . .had no reasonable expectation of obtaining employment 
that would enable her to support herself at a standard of 
living even approaching that which she had during marriage. 
She had only worked at minor clerical jobs for two brief periods 
over 20 years apart. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial 
court's alimony award was inequitable and remanded the case for 
further findings consistent with the opinion. 
In Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988), the 
trial court's order automatically decreased monthly alimony. The 
parties had been married thirty years and were "nearing fifty 
years of age". She had no income. The trial court made only one 
conclusionary finding to the effect that the wife was "capable of 
meaningful employment in the future". In reversing, the Court of 
Appeals noted that: 
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• . .She had no earnings in the year before trial; she has 
only a high school education and average job skills to 
market. Her ability to work is impaired by the disability 
of their adult daughter. She will have difficulty finding 
and retaining a full-time job. If employed, her earnings 
would undoubtedly be meager for a long period, given her 
lack of education, training or work experience. (p. 1334) 
Each of these cases shows that permanent alimony is justi-
fied only where there are unusual economic circumstances like 
poor health, disabled children, advanced age, poor skills, or 
weak education. None of those things affects this case. 
II. APPLICATION OF THE COURT'S CRITERIA TO THIS CASE PRECLUDES 
AN AWARD OF PERMANENT ALIMONY. 
A. Respondent is Well Educated, in Good Health, and has 
Deliberately Taken a Part-Time, Low-Paying Job. 
The Court's decisions suggest that an award of permanent 
alimony is proper where there are exigent circumstances such as 
advanced age or ill health. Those same decisions conversely 
suggest that without those circumstnces permanent alimony is 
improper. 
The trial court expressly found that Respondent was a 
healthy, able-bodied person, capable of gainful employment 
(R. 447). Respondent, as a matter of personal choice, is cur-
rently employed only three days a week at the Salt Lake Tribune, 
earning only $800 a month (R. 447). Like Mrs. Rayburn, Respon-
dent has a college degree and she also has had sufficient post-
graduate education to qualify for a teacher's certificate in Utah 
and North Carolina (Stip. of Facts S[5) . She taught full time for 
three years while Appellant was in law school (Stip. of Facts 26) 
and as a substitute teacher thereafter (Resp. depos. p. 11). She 
has favorable and immediate employment prospects as a teacher and 
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would be capable of making a minimum of $16,000 a year over only 
a nine-month period. This uneconomic choice is one made possible 
by the alimony award. Her teaching certificate has lapsed, but 
she has completed four or five hours out of the nine hours 
required for recertif ication (Stip. of Facts S3 & and Resp. 
depos. p.6). She operated a silk flower business through her 
home (Respondent's Depos. pp. 28-30). When the trial court 
suggested that Respondent seek employment (R. 334), her response 
was a part-time job with the Salt Lake Tribune. She has stayed 
in that job. 
B. Respondent Made no Sacrifice to Appellant's Education. 
She Shared Greatly in the Benefits of his Work. 
There is not in this case evidence of any unusual sacrifice 
on the part of the wife so that the husband could get a profes-
sional degree. She did not remain uneducated and untrained. At 
the time of the marriage Respondent had already completed the 
work for her Bachelor's degree from the Brigham Young University 
(Respondent's Depos. p.5). After their marriage on September 9, 
1970, both parties enrolled in school and both worked (Respon-
dent's Depos. pp. 6-7). Appellant completed the work necessary 
for his Bachelor's degree and Respondent completed two of the 
three semesters of work needed for a teacher's certificate 
(Respondent's Depos. p.6). Appellant received a scholarship to 
Duke University Law School and with that scholarship and gifts 
from his parents paid for the tuition and expenses of the law-
degree (Stip. of Facts 27). She taught school during the three 
years he was in law school and contributed to their basic living 
expenses (Respondent's Depos. ^6) . Upon the completion of law 
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school he immediately obtained employment. She discontinued work 
outside the home and they started raising their family (Stip. of 
Facts 28). 
Thus, this is not a case where the wife worked to pay for 
the husband's degree and then early on — at the threshold of his 
higher earnings — the parties divorced. The parties here were 
married nearly sixteen years. They both completed their educa-
tion. From the beginning the Respondent shared in the benefits 
resulting from Appellant's higher earnings. They traveled exten-
sively, including an extended trip to Eurcpe (Stip. of Facts 
5S9/10). They acquired property and shared therein through the 
division made by the court. (See Appendix A hereto) The^ 
separated in June of 1985, but liberal provisions were made for 
her support by a temporary order (R. 28) . The divorce became 
effective July 23, 1986 (R. 114), but the alimony issues were not 
settled at that time and the temporary order which gave her 
$2,864. per month for herself and the children continued. The 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce was entered February 3, 1988 
(R. 469) , so that there really was provision thus made for 
approximately eighteen months before the Supplemental Decree cf 
Divorce was entered and alimony was awarded. Then the court 
awarded her $1,500 per month for the children, $1,050 per month 
alimony for herself and ordered Appellant to pay the Respondent's 
attorney fees in the amount of $17,246.23. The alimony was to 
decrease to $800 per month the next year and to $650 per month 
thereafter until the Respondent remarries or cohabits, or until 
one of the parties dies (R. 467,468). 
Under these facts, and following the Court's prior decis-
ions, she should not be given a lien on his future earnings for 
the rest of their lives. She is not a woman hopelessly dependent 
on Appellant until she finds another husband. She should be 
encouraged to be independent and self-reliant. After a 
reasonable adjustment period of five years, the alimony ought to 
be terminated. Indeed, in her proposed settlement filed with the 
trial court, Respondent contemplated alimony "for a period five 
years or until [she] completes anticipated advanced degree 
education" (R. 93) . (This is also included herein as Appendix 
B.) With the temporary order and the supplemental decree Respon-
dent has already had fairly liberal support since November 27, 
1985 (R. 30) . Where a wife is educated, competent, skilled and 
healthy, it is unreasonable and unnecessary to give her a lien on 
her former husband's earnings for the rest of their lives. Such 
an award is a great disincentive to find independence through 
education or career advancement; it is an invitation to be 
dependent and unproductive. 
Even if she resumed her career as a teacher and increased 
her income to $16,000 or more per year for nine months of work, 
under current decisions that would likely not be the kind of 
change of circumstances which would permit modification. In this 
regard see Felt v. Felt, 27 Utah 2d 103, 493 P.2d 620 (1972), 
where the Utah Supreme Court dealt with this issue. Under that 
holding, the Appellant may never be relieved of the alimony 
obligation if Respondent elects not to remarry. The children are 
now of an age where work outside the home is practicable. In 
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four years the oldest child will be of legal age (Stip. of Facts 
52). In ten years all three of them will be. 
A more reasonable and economic approach was taken in Oregon 
in Hinrichs v. Hinrichs, 588 P.2d 130 (Or.App. 1978). There the 
court held that spousal support for five years should be adequate 
to permit the wife to obtain additional training necessary to 
accomplish readjustment and to gain employment. Thus, a decree 
for permanent spousal support was modified to terminate five 
years from the date of the decree dissolving the marriage. The 
property division involved placing value on the husband's inter-
est in his business, including its income potentialr ard then 
balancing the disparity in division by awarding permanent alimony 
to the wife. The court held that it is not the policy of the law 
to give the wife "a perpetual lien against her former husband's 
future income." (p. 131). See also Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 
379 (Utah App. 1983), p. 383. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully urge the court to place a reasonable expir-
ation date on the alimony award. Respondent has already had 
liberal support under a temporary support order and the Supple-
mental Decree of Divorce. Specifically, she was awarded $2,864 
per month for child support and alimony during the pendency of 
the divorce. The divorce was granted effective July 23, 1986, 
but alimony was not fixed at that time and the temporary award 
continued. The court did not enter its Supplemental Decree of 
Divorce awarding alimony until February 3, 1988. That decree 
ordered the Appellant to pay to Respondent alimony in the sum of 
$1,050 per month commencing with the month of July, 1987, for a 
period of one year, at which time the alimony v,as reduced to $800 
per month for a period of one year, and then was reduced -co $650 
per month. The trial court ordered that Respondent's alimony 
entitlement shall continue until such time as the Respondent 
shall remarry, co-habit, or die, or the Appellant should die, 
whichever event occurs first. 
The trial court found that Respondent is able bodied and 
employable. She is working now and earning approximately $9,984 
per year. She has a college education qualifying her for a 
teacher's certificate. She shared in Appellant's higher earnings 
from the time he got out of college until the divorce — a period 
of 16 years — and she shared in the marital assets through a 
liberal division of the joint property. Under the facts of this 
case Respondent should not be awarded a lifetime lien on the 
Appellant's earnings. 
We respectfully submit that the alimony should terminate 
five years after July 1, 1987. 
Dated this *j, day of May, 1989. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD W. CLYDE 
CRAIG W. ANDERSON 
By<_ i jji en t^d ol <— L/ 
Attorneys for Appellant , , C 
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I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing to be 
mailed, postage prepaid to Respondent's Attorney, B. L. Dart, 
Suite 1330, 310 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, this / 7 
day of May, 1989. 
Salt Lake Countv Utah 
^ _ _ - — - \ FE3 3 1988 
A^orSeffo^pWiff [ ^ \ L U ^ J j ^ ^ ^ g R ? ? " 
310 South Main Street \J 8y ^ (XrW^ 
S u i t e 1330 -> Deeper* 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo— 
CAROL VAN WAGONER, : 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
Plaintiff, : DECREE OF DIVORCE 
v. : 
MARK 0. VAN WAGONER, : Civil No. D85-3792 
Defendant, : Judge Moffat 
oooOooo—-
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on the remaining financial issues on the 15th day of April, 1987, 
at 9:00 a.m., plaintiff and defendant both appearing in person 
and represented by counsel and the Court having heard testimony 
from each of the parties and various witnesses and exhibits 
having been introduced and the matter having been argued and 
submitted and taken under advisement, and the Court having made 
and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. On or about September 15, 1986, this Court 
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Decree of 
Divorce which reserved issues of custody and financial issues. 
QG0452 
We have not duplicated pages 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, 
which deal primarily with child custoday, but 
they are in the Record, at pc-ges 4 52-457. 
Center may designate a replacement mediator mutually acceptable 
to the parties. 
The costs for the services of Augie Plenk will be 
shared by the parties'with Mark to pay 70 percent (70%) and Carol 
to pay 30 percent (30%) of Plenk's charges, provided that charges 
for which Carol will be responsible will not exceed the sum of 
$100 in any month. Insurance provided by either party against 
the cost of the mediation will be a credit to that parties share 
of the cost. In addition, Mark agrees to pay for, and the 
parties agree to engage in four visits with Augie Plenk to assist 
Augie Plenk in obtaining a background in the case with the 
children available to participate as suggested by Augie Plenk. 
The marties mutually agree that Augie Plenk will be provided with 
any information and materials which have been created in this 
case including evaluation reports and psychological reports. 
Each party shall notify the other party as soon 
as reasonably possible of any illness requiring medical attention 
or any emergency involving the minor children. 
Each party agrees to give the other party sixty 
60 days notice of intention to change county of residence. 
3. During the marriage the parties acquired certain 
household furnishings and effects and.other personal property 
which are divided as follows: 
a. Plaintiff shall receive and after receipt 
shall be fully responsible for: 
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(i) The 1977 Volvo automobile• 
(ii) The bank accounts presently in 
plaintiff's name. 
(iii) The sum of $500 which represents one-
half of marketable securities held by defendant and valued at 
$1,000. 
(iv) All household furnishings and effects 
and other marital personal property presently in plaintiff's 
possession, except as provided in Paragraph 3(b)(iv) below. 
(v) One-half of the parties joint IRA 
account, which half is valued at $1,000. 
(vi) The Delta Airlines stock or any proceeds 
from its sale. 
(vii) The parties' 1984 income tax refund. 
(viii) The piano which shall remain with 
plaintiff but in the event it is to be disposed of by the 
plaintiff at any time in the future or is to be stored for any 
period of time and not utilized for music lessons for the 
children it shall become the property of the defendant and shall 
be promptly surrendered to the defendant by the plaintiff free of 
any liens and encumbrances. 
(ix) All other household furnishings and 
effects and other personal property acquired by plaintiff 
subsequent to the separation of the parties on June 21, 1985. 
b. Defendant shall receive and after receipt 
shall be fully responsible for the following: 
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(i) The bank accounts presently in 
defendant's own name. 
(ii) Cash in defendant's possession. 
(iii) The marketable securities held by 
defendant valued at $1,000. 
(iv) All of the household furniture 
furnishings and effects and other personal property presently in 
defendant's possession and the following household furniture, 
furnishings and effects and other personal property presently in 
plaintiff's possession, namely, the JVC video camera, two pieces 
of artwork of defendant's choice, one Lladro sculpture of 
defendant's choice and defendant's tools other than tools 
necesary for yard care such as rake, hoe, shovel, etc. 
(v) Gavin's bedroom furniture shall remain 
with Gavin so long as it is in his use but shall be transferred 
to the possesion of defendant if not used by Gavin. 
(vi) All other household furnishings and 
effects and other personal property acquired by defendant 
subsequent to the separation of the parties on June 21, 1985. 
4. During the marriage of the parties defendant 
became involved in a wrongful death action involving a sign which 
fell from a Smith's Food King store. No order is made at this 
time concerning the proceeds, if any, from this litigation to 
which defendant may become entitled and at such time as this 
case is resolved defendant is ordered to notify plaintiff so that 
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at that time the Court can make a determination of whether any 
distribution of such proceeds is appropriate• 
5. The house and real property at 2195 Parleys 
Terrace, Salt Lake City, Utah, is ordered to be listed 
immediately for sale with Kay Berger, a multiple listing 
realtor. Plaintiff is ordered to cooperate with Kay Berger in 
doing whatever Kay Berger desires or requests in the way of 
cooperation to assist in the sale of said property, including but 
not limited to maintaining the residence in a neat, attractive 
and orderly fashion as to enhance its likelihood of a sale. 
Until the house and real property at 2195 Parleys 
Terrace is sold, plaintiff shall be responsible for payment of 
the first mortgage obligation and each of the parties shall be 
responsible for 50 percent of the insurance and 50 percent of the 
taxes. If either party pays more than his or her proportionate 
share of insurance or taxes, the overpayment shall become a lien 
against the defaulting party's proceeds from the home. 
Upon the sale of said house and real property the 
funds received therefor shall be escrowed and applied as follows: 
a. To pay all expenses of the sale such as real 
estate commissions, title reports and title insurance, proration 
of taxes and other standard closing costs. 
b. The note to Vivian McCarthy will be paid in 
full or assumed by the buyer. 
c. The balance will be allocated one-half to the 
plaintiff and one-half to the defendant. 
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d. From defendant's one-half there shall be paid 
from escrow in the following priority: 
(i) B. L. Dart# Esq., as provided herein in 
paragraph 18. 
(ii) Defendant's obligation to the IRS. 
(iii) Defendant's obligation to Zions First 
National Bank. 
e. If either party shall have paid any debt or 
obligation of the other relating to said house and real property, 
or relating to the two obligations to Zions First National Bank 
or the 1985 income tax return on which the parties have a shared 
liability, any such payment shall be reimbursed with interest at 
eight percent per annum from the time of the advance until the 
time of payment. The payments shall be made directly from the 
escrow. 
f. The balance of plaintiff's allocated share 
shall be distributed to plaintiff and the balance of defendant's 
allocated share shall be distributed to defendant. 
6. The interest of the parties in the real property 
located on the Southest corner of Third South and West Temple 
Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah (the "West Temple Property"), is 
awarded one-half to plaintiff and one-half to defendant. In the 
event of sale, the parties are ordered to share equally in the 
sales proceeds and in the future until such sale, each party is 
ordered to pay equally in the costs and expenses applicable to 
this property. In the event either party fails to pay his or her 
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share of any assessment against the property ten days prior to 
the due date, the other party may pay such assessment and it 
shall work a forfeiture of the non-paying party's interest in the 
property to the party making the payment. Defendant is currently 
the partner in the West Temple property and is ordered to provide 
to the plaintiff notice as soon as he receives it of any 
assessment so that plaintiff will have as much notice as possible 
of any assessment amount and due date. 
7. Defendant is awarded all right, title and 
interest in and to his partnership interest in the law firm of 
Van Wagoner and Stevens, as well as his proportionate share of 
all assets and income of such firm provided that this award of 
the partnership interest does not supersede or in any way affect 
the provisions of paragraph 4 of this Decree of Divorce relating 
to the Smith's Food King suit. 
8. Various debts and obligations have been incurred 
by the parties during the marriage which shall be assumed and 
paid as follows: 
a. Plaintiff shall pay, settle or otherwise 
compromise if not already done and shall indemnify defendant from 
the following obligations: 
(i) All debts allocated to plaintiff under 
prior orders of this Court. 
(ii) All currently outstanding debts incurred 
by plaintiff subsequent to the separation of the parties on June 
21, 1985, in connection with charge cards or similar accounts. 
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(iii) The outstanding principal and interest 
on any loans incurred by plaintiff subsequent to the separation 
of the parties on June 21, 1985. 
(iv) All separate tax liabilities incurred by 
plaintiff subsequent to January 1, 1986. 
(v) All other debts incurred by plaintiff 
prior and subsequent to the separation of the parties on June 21, 
1985. 
(vi) One-half of the outstanding principal 
and interest owing to Zions First National Bank for a balloon 
payment, which half is valued at approximately $2,900.00. 
(vii) One-half of the obligation owing to 
Zions First National Bank regarding Taylor, which half is valued 
at approximately $10,825.00. 
(viii) One-fourth of the currently 
outstanding income tax liability for the 19 85 tax year in the 
approximate sum of $2,000 subject to defendant providing 
documentation of the exact value of this obligation. 
b. Defendant shall pay, settle or otherwise 
compromise if not already done and shall indemnify plaintiff from 
the debts and obligations owing as follows: 
(i) All debts allocated to defendant under 
prior orders of this Court. 
(ii) All debts incurred by defendant prior 
and subsequent to the separation of the parties on June 21, 1985 
in connection with charge cards or similar accounts. 
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(iii) The outstanding principal and interest 
owning on any loans incurred by defendant subsequent to the 
separation of the parties on June 21, 1985• 
(iv) All separate tax liabilities incurred by 
defendant subsequent to January 1, 1986. 
(v) One-half of the outstanding principal and 
interest owing to Zions First National Bank for a balloon 
payment, which half is valued at approximately $2,900.00. 
(vi) One-half of the obligation owing to 
Zions First National Bank regarding Taylor, which half is valued 
at approximately $10,825.00. 
(vii) Three-fourths of the income tax 
liability for 1985, which three-fourths is in the approximate sum 
of $6,000 subject to defendant providing documentation of the 
exact value of this obligation. 
(viii) Except as to the Smith's Food King 
case which is to be governed solely by paragraph 4 hereof, and is 
not modified hereby all liabilities incurred in connection with 
defendant's law practice. 
c. Any debts and obligations not listed in 
paragraph 8(a) or 8(b) above shall be paid as follows: 
(i) Those incurred on behalf of plaintiff 
should be paid, settled and compromised solely by plaintiff. 
(ii) Those incurred on behalf of defendant 
should be paid, settled and compromised solely by defendant. 
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We have not duplicated Pages 15, 16 and 17, but they 
are ±h the Record at pages 466, 4 67 and 4 68. 
offset, but is merely directing that the offset not be made 
without court approval insofar as alimony and support money is 
concerned. J 
DATED thi .J. day o 
APPROVAL AS TO FORM: 
EDWARD W. C L Y D E H 
Attorney for Defendan 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLSY 
CLERK 
L
 ClerK gjepuiy 
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Husband ( ) Wife (X) 
PROPOSED SETTLEMENT OF PENDING DIVORCE LITIGATION 
Child support $1,000/child Total (per month)$ 3,000 
Alimony SI ,000* Total (per month)$ 1,000 
*Alimony for a period of five years or until plaintiff completes 
anticipated advanced degree education. 
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION: 
There should be an equitable division of all the assets of 
the parties following a complete accounting by defendant 
with the division of property to be effectively half to each 
party. The decree of divorce should have the following 
provisions: 
1. Either provision for a new car for plaintiff or alimony and 
support payments to allow for a monthly payment on a new car. 
2. Provision that any alimony and support award have an 
escalator based on any increases in defendant's income. 
3. Plaintiff retain all items of personal property in the home 
after appropriate credit to defendant for half the value. 
4. In addition to support, defendant be responsible for 
maintenance of health and accident insurance on the children and 
be responsible for one-half of any non-insured medical, 
orthodontia and dental expenses. 
5. The decree should provide for a withhold-and-deliver 
provision relating to defendant obligation for support. 
6. Plaintiff should be awarded her attorney's fees in this 
divorce proceeding. 
Grand Total (per month) $ 4,000 
I, CAROL VAN WAGONER, proposed the above settlement. 
Plaintiff 
